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I. Introduction 
Hedge funds have avoided direct regulation under federal 
securities laws for most of their existence.1 The hedge fund 
industry has gained a reputation for being secretive and opaque 
mainly because information available on hedge funds is scarce.2 
Since the collapse of a massive hedge fund in the late 1990s, 
however, hedge funds have been targeted for increased 
regulation.3 Over the decades, the federal government has 
provided a variety of policy reasons in favor of regulating hedge 
funds. The ebb and flow of hedge fund scrutiny, and the policy 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Part II.A (discussing how hedge funds have historically 
avoided traditional federal securities laws). 
 2. See Barbara C. George, Lynne V. Dymally & Maria K. Boss, The 
Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry: Victim or Culprit in the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359, 366 (2009) (referring to 
the hedge fund industry as “under-regulated and opaque”); see also J.W. Verret, 
Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation, Part II, A 
Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 814 (2007) (explaining that 
the hedge fund industry is highly secretive). 
 3. See infra Part II.B (discussing the implications that the collapse of the 
massive hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) had on hedge 
fund regulation). 
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rationales behind hedge fund regulation, have predictably 
correlated with major financial events.4 
In 2007, two Bear Stearns hedge funds that had largely 
invested in mortgage-backed investments5 collapsed.6 This 
signaled a deteriorating U.S. mortgage market that would 
eventually lead to the financial meltdown known as the subprime 
mortgage crisis of 2008 (Financial Crisis).7 Soon after, the 
Financial Crisis caused the United States to fall into a deep 
recession.8 Hedge funds’ involvement in the Financial Crisis, like 
the hedge fund industry itself, is not fully understood.9 
Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis finally tipped the scales back 
toward hedge fund regulation. 
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act)10 to 
provide stability to the damaged U.S. financial system.11 
Although several areas of the Dodd–Frank Act affect hedge 
funds, this Note focuses on Title IV of the Act, entitled the 
                                                                                                     
 4. See SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION § 3:1 (2011) (noting 
that “the laws and rules to which hedge funds and their managers must adhere 
are found in a variety of statutes and regulations, reflective, to a large extent, of 
the gradual emergence of the hedge fund”).  
 5. See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text (explaining the basics of 
mortgage-backed investments and their involvement in the financial crisis of 
2008). 
 6. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 4 (2012) (noting that in “July 2007, two Bear Stearns hedge 
funds that had invested heavily in CDOs failed”). 
 7. See Matthew Beville, Dino Falaschetti & Michael J. Orlando, An 
Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
849, 891 (2010) (“Though it was unclear at the time, the collapse of Bear 
Stearns’s funds was the first sign that the mortgage market was collapsing and 
that a large number of financial firms were overexposed to asset-backed 
securities and related derivatives.”). 
 8. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that the “economy sank into 
the deepest recession in decades” because of the Financial Crisis). 
 9. See George et al., supra note 2, at 359–60 (noting that some argue that 
“hedge funds were among the contributors to the fiscal crisis” of 2008, while 
others argue “that the hedge fund industry did not play a direct precipitating 
role in the events leading to the financial meltdown”). 
 10. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (establishing financial 
regulatory reform to provide stability to the U.S. financial system after the 
Financial Crisis). 
 11. Id. 
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Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 
(PFIARA).12 The PFIARA directly regulates the hedge fund 
industry by requiring certain hedge fund advisers to register with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the 
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act).13 This Note evaluates 
whether hedge fund adviser registration is necessary in light of 
the Financial Crisis and the goals of the PFIARA (and the Dodd–
Frank Act generally), and if so, what form that regulation should 
take. 
Part II provides an introduction to hedge funds by focusing 
on their history, general structures, and legal frameworks. Part 
III discusses regulatory aspects of hedge funds prior to the 
Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act. 
Specifically, Part III focuses on how hedge funds avoided 
regulation over the years and looks to specific events that spurred 
interest in hedge fund regulation. Part IV explains the basics of 
the Financial Crisis and hedge funds’ involvement in it. Part IV 
then details the implications of the PFIARA’s enactment. Part V 
analyzes whether hedge fund adviser registration under the 
Advisers Act is necessary in light of the PFIARA’s goals. Next, 
Part V provides recommendations for hedge fund regulation going 
forward. Finally, Part VI offers conclusions. 
Ultimately, this Note proposes that hedge fund adviser 
registration under the Advisers Act is unnecessary to advance the 
PFIARA’s goals because (i) there is already an adequate hedge 
fund anti-fraud rule in place; (ii) hedge funds have increased 
transparency to investors over the years; and (iii) hedge funds 
have a sophisticated investor class that does not need the same 
protections provided to ordinary investors. Because hedge fund 
adviser registration is unnecessary to the PFIARA’s goals, it is a 
waste of the hedge fund industry’s and the SEC’s resources. 
The collection of systemic-risk-related14 data from hedge 
funds, however, is necessary in light of the Financial Crisis, but 
                                                                                                     
 12. See id. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
20 note) (“This title may be cited as the ‘Private Fund Investment Advisers 
Registration Act of 2010’.”). 
 13. See id. §§ 403–404, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending adviser registration and reporting 
requirements under the Advisers Act). 
 14. See infra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (explaining the concept 
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adviser registration is not needed to achieve this task. This Note 
asserts that once a threshold (based on hedge fund size) is 
determined for an aggregate group of hedge funds most pertinent 
to systemic risk assessment, the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) should collect data directly through Form PF. 
Collecting data from smaller hedge funds that do not meet the 
determined threshold will produce an over-inclusive regime. At 
the same time, this Note argues that once a proper threshold is 
established, no hedge funds with assets under management 
(AUM) exceeding the determined threshold should be exempt 
from providing information related to systemic risk. Because size 
is critical to assessing systemic risk concerns, exempting any 
hedge funds with AUM exceeding the determined threshold 
would produce an under-inclusive element to the regime as well. 
This Note explores detailed recommendations to alleviate these 
issues. 
II. Hedge Funds in General 
Part II of this Note addresses historical and legal aspects 
regarding hedge funds before the Dodd–Frank Act. Part II.A 
gives a history of hedge funds, while also discussing the general 
structures and investment strategies of more popular hedge 
funds. Part II.B examines hedge funds’ general legal frameworks.  
A. Defining Hedge Fund 
Hedge funds are hard to define because of their diverse, 
complex, and secretive trading strategies.15 Typically, “hedge 
funds” refer to private funds that pool the assets of wealthy and 
institutional investors “to invest and trade in equity securities, 
fixed-income securities, derivatives, futures and other financial 
                                                                                                     
of systemic risk). 
 15. See DOUGLAS HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF 
HEDGE FUNDS 1–2 (2005) (providing multiple examples of various hedge fund 
investment strategies and noting that “investment philosophies of hedge funds 
are as diverse as their portfolio managers”); see also Verret, supra note 2, at 814 
(explaining that the hedge fund industry is highly secretive because hedge funds 
want to protect their unique trading strategies). 
656 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651 (2013) 
instruments.”16 Most hedge funds are professionally managed and 
carry high levels of debt to increase certain investment positions 
with the intention of amplifying gains.17 Hedge funds are 
sometimes referred to as alternative investments because usually 
they are not publicly traded, not very liquid, and difficult to 
value.18 Also, despite the fact that hedge funds vary broadly in 
investment strategy, they all strive to achieve absolute return, 
which means that their “strategies are designed to generate 
positive return regardless of overall market performance.”19 
Most agree that Alfred Winslow Jones, a Columbia 
University sociologist, pioneered the modern day hedge fund in 
1949.20 Jones created a fund that would “hedge” against market 
risks by offsetting declining values of long-stock positions with 
appreciating values of short-stock positions and vice versa.21 Also, 
Jones borrowed money for a portion of the fund’s investments to 
increase leverage (debt-to-equity) in the hopes of magnifying 
returns.22 Because Jones’s fund outperformed the leading mutual 
                                                                                                     
 16. HAMMER, supra note 15, at 1. 
 17. See Verret, supra note 2, at 803 (“High leverage, management 
expertise, performance fees, and absolute return strategies are the hallmarks of 
the industry.”). 
 18. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:3 (noting that alternative investments 
differ from traditional investments because they are “generally not traded on a 
public market and therefore tend to be less liquid and more difficult to value”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term 
Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 189–90 (1999) (explaining 
that Alfred Winslow Jones started the first hedge fund in 1949). 
 21. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1 (discussing that “Jones reasoned 
that complementing a long portfolio with short positions would provide a ‘hedge’ 
against the influence of market movements on his portfolio as market-generated 
declines in the value of the long portfolio would be offset by similarly generated 
gains in the short portfolio”). This is because a long position appreciates when 
the value of the held security rises, while a short position appreciates when the 
underlying security’s value decreases. Id. Note that a long position generally 
refers to a speculative position in an asset that is purchased and held with the 
hopes that the asset’s value will rise over time. Id. Jones typically obtained his 
short positions by short selling stocks; this is where Jones would sell a stock 
that he did not own (borrowed the sold stock) and then would replace the sold 
stock once the price fell to make a profit. Id. In sum, Jones was taking long 
positions in stocks that he thought were undervalued and short positions in 
stocks that he thought were overvalued to reduce “the prospect of losses by 
taking a counterbalancing transaction.” Edwards, supra note 20, at 190. 
 22. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1 (detailing how borrowing, or 
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funds of that era, the hedge fund concept became increasingly 
popular.23 
In 1970, an estimated 150 funds were managing over $1 
billion in assets.24 By 2007, many factors—including the creation 
of new financial markets and instruments, an influx of capital, 
and an increase in the number of hedge funds—led to an 
estimated $1.93 trillion in total AUM for hedge funds.25 
Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis negatively impacted the hedge 
fund industry both in performance26 and reputation.27 Although 
the hedge fund industry has slowly recovered, total AUM “remain 
below their peak level in 2007.”28 Still, hedge funds play a key 
role in the U.S. economy, and it is estimated that there are 
almost “ten thousand hedge funds currently operating and 
managing $1.5 trillion in assets.”29 
Hedge funds’ general structures are diverse, but the majority 
of funds share some common characteristics. Most hedge funds 
require a significant initial minimum investment from their 
investors30 and restrict their investors from withdrawing capital 
                                                                                                     
leverage, “can magnify returns” by increasing the amount in a certain position, 
but it can also magnify losses if the leveraged position moves contrarily of where 
the investor intended). 
 23. See id. (explaining that as Jones’s fund outperformed the leading 
mutual funds of his day, the hedge fund concept “generated interest with the 
investment community”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. (discussing how new financial markets and instruments in the 
1980s, combined with an increase in capital in the 1990s, spurred hedge fund 
growth). 
 26. See id. (examining how the Financial Crisis, among other reasons, led 
to “negative performance as well as record withdrawals by investors which 
combined to result in a decline in total assets managed in the hedge fund 
industry . . . at the end of 2008”). 
 27. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 391 (2011) (discussing that in the aftermath of the Financial 
Crisis, “[h]edge funds have been blamed for their part in the crisis and have 
become a scapegoat for the problems affecting many aspects of the financial 
markets”). 
 28. LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:1. 
 29. Scott V. Wagner, Comment, Hedge Funds: The Final Frontier of 
Securities Regulation and a Last Hope for Economic Revival, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 1, 3 (2009). 
 30. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that hedge funds usually 
have high minimum-investment requirements and giving an example of a large 
hedge fund in the late 1990s that required a $5 million minimum investment). 
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during a fixed “lock-up” period.31 The lock-up period is designed 
to encourage long-term investment, while ensuring the fund’s 
liquidity by limiting withdrawals.32 Typically, hedge funds 
compensate their managers in ways that highly reward gains.33 
Hedge fund managers usually require a 1–2% fee for all AUM to 
cover operating costs, while also requiring a 15–25% performance 
fee of all profits made in a given year.34 From a managerial 
standpoint, this is a very attractive feature because mutual funds 
and other institutional funds usually pay flat fees.35 To combat 
excessive risk-taking, and to further align the interests of 
management and clients, most hedge funds force managers to 
invest a certain amount of personal capital into the fund as 
well.36 There is no doubt, however, that the possibility of 
enormous profits has attracted great talent to the hedge fund 
industry and has driven the development of creative investment 
strategies typical of hedge funds.37 
                                                                                                     
 31. See id. (explaining that most hedge funds limit the ability of their 
investors to withdraw funds so that the managers can invest in more illiquid 
instruments over longer periods of time). The term “lock-up” refers to the 
minimum holding period that the investors will have to wait until they can 
withdraw funds. LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:3.3. 
 32. See id.  
 33. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 3 (“Hedge fund managers structure their 
funds to create internal incentives that maximize returns.”). 
 34. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that hedge fund 
administrative fees usually range from 1–1.5% of assets under management, 
while large incentive fees range from 15–20%). Many funds also impose a 
“hurdle rate,” which requires fund managers to exceed a minimum rate of 
return before the manager’s performance fee will actually kick in. LEDERMAN, 
supra note 4, § 2:3.3. Furthermore, some hedge funds subject their managers to 
“high water marks,” which require fund managers to cover prior years’ losses 
before earning a performance fee. Id. 
 35. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that mutual funds and 
other institutional investors are usually prohibited from using incentive 
performance fees, so they often have to employ a flat fee rate). 
 36. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:2.4 (pointing out that a major 
distinction between hedge funds and mutual funds is the fact that most “[h]edge 
fund managers usually invest a significant portion of their own liquid net worth 
in their hedge funds alongside of the fund’s other investors”). 
 37. See Verret, supra note 2, at 828–29 (stating that mutual funds have 
had a hard time competing with hedge funds for professional talent because of 
hedge fund fee structures). 
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As noted, hedge funds are extremely diverse because of their 
flexible nature.38 Exploring the basics of three of the more 
popular hedge fund strategies, however, will shed light on this 
alternative investment. One type of hedge fund uses a hedge-
equity strategy similar to Alfred Jones’s long- and short-position 
model, but in the modern world, its focus is more specified—such 
as a country-specific equity market focus or an industry equity 
market focus.39 Another type of hedge fund, called a global-
opportunistic hedge fund, looks to exploit macroeconomic factors 
in different countries or regions.40 These hedge funds are more 
event-driven—fund managers may look at political or currency 
trends—and use their managers’ discretion or advanced computer 
systems to find developing trends.41 A third type of hedge fund, 
known as an arbitrage (or relative-value) hedge fund, looks to 
“exploit pricing inefficiencies between or among related 
instruments.”42 This very small sample of hedge fund strategies 
shows just how diverse and flexible the hedge fund industry is as 
a whole. 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Sue A. Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register 
with the SEC, but More Information and Other Alternatives Are Recommended, 
67 LA. L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2006) (“While many trade in securities, bonds, and 
currencies, some also trade in derivatives and other assets, such as movies and 
even the rights to soccer players.”). 
 39. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:2.1 (noting the hedged equity strategy 
is similar to the Jones model, but has evolved over time to focus more on areas 
like country-specific and industry-specific equity markets). It is estimated that 
30% of hedge funds use a strategy similar to the hedge equity strategy. Id. 
 40. See id. § 1:2.2 (explaining that the global-opportunistic strategy looks 
at macroeconomic data to speculate on factors such as political or currency 
trends). 
 41. See id. (“Global macro managers have historically been known for 
making high risk, significantly leveraged investments that are often directional 
in nature rather than being hedged.”); see also Verret, supra note 2, at 803 
(“They may trade commodities or currency swaps based on macroeconomic data, 
or trade on expected results of a merger or acquisition between two 
companies.”). 
 42. LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 1:2.3. 
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B. Legal Framework 
The vast majority of domestic hedge funds are set up as 
limited partnerships or limited liability companies.43 These 
structures allow them flexibility in terms of the relationship 
between their managers and their investors.44 These are the most 
popular legal structures for hedge funds because they offer 
flexibility in governance (and management), limited liability, and 
certain tax advantages.45 Most hedge funds form in Delaware, 
“where they are subject to Delaware fiduciary duties.”46 Delaware 
provides hedge funds with legal predictability because it has well-
developed case law for both limited partnerships and limited 
liability companies.47 
Most of the legal implications facing hedge funds before the 
Dodd–Frank Act hinged on the fact that sophisticated, wealthy 
investors have traditionally made up the majority of hedge fund 
investors.48 Historically, the government has viewed this affluent 
class of investors as having the capabilities necessary to assess 
the risks associated with hedge funds.49 For this reason, before 
the Dodd–Frank Act hedge funds were largely unregulated.50 
                                                                                                     
 43. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 190 (“Although a hedge fund can be 
organized as a limited liability company, most are organized as limited 
partnerships . . . .”). 
 44. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:3.3 (discussing that organizing a hedge 
fund as a limited partnership or limited liability company provides flexibility 
between the managers and investors because “[s]ubject to the manager’s 
fiduciary and disclosure obligations, these terms can be tailored and adjusted for 
different groups of investors within the fund”). 
 45. See id. § 2:3 (determining that limited partnerships and limited 
liability gives hedge funds “flexibility and enables the fund to meet both 
objectives of limited liability and tax efficiency”). The tax ramifications of hedge 
funds are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 46. See Verret, supra note 2, at 804–05. 
 47. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 2:3 (explaining that Delaware is the 
most popular jurisdiction for hedge fund formation because of its well-developed 
case law for limited partnerships and limited liability companies). 
 48. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 190 (“The clear intent of the legal 
framework surrounding hedge funds is to limit them to wealthy and 
sophisticated investors who are capable of assessing the risks associated with 
hedge fund investments.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. (stating that because the government has viewed the affluent 
class of typical hedge fund investors as capable of assessing the risks of hedge 
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Some argue that minimal regulation in the hedge fund 
industry has provided a true alternative investment for investors 
because fund managers can creatively adapt to changing financial 
markets without the fear of competitors immediately copying 
their investment strategies.51 This freedom encourages the 
development of diverse financial products because hedge funds 
can produce unique investment strategies that may have little (or 
no) correlation with traditional financial benchmarks.52 
Furthermore, hedge funds encourage broad and efficient markets 
by increasing trade in both established and less-established 
markets.53 Price discovery of nontraditional assets is possible 
because larger markets (or markets in general) are created for 
nontraditional assets that normally would be extremely difficult 
to value.54 Thus, liquidity becomes possible for traditionally 
illiquid assets.55 Opponents of hedge fund regulation argue that 
“[t]he lack of regulation has been paramount to the hedge fund’s 
success.”56 
III. (Attempted) Regulation Before the Dodd–Frank Act 
Predictably, hedge fund regulation correlates with the 
growth and popularity of the hedge fund industry—the interest in 
regulating the hedge fund industry has grown with the 
development of the industry itself.57 Because hedge funds have 
                                                                                                     
funds, hedge funds have gone mostly unregulated). 
 51. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 5 (noting that the limited regulation of 
hedge funds has allowed them to “adapt better to dynamic markets by 
encouraging research and development of new and creative financial models”). 
 52. See Verret, supra note 2, at 804 (pointing out that hedge funds typically 
have higher than average returns that “do not correlate with returns from the 
long Standard and Poor’s 500 . . . or other traditional benchmarks”). 
 53. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 6–7 (discussing that hedge funds provide 
large amounts of capital and help increase efficiency in both traditional and 
nontraditional markets). 
 54. See id. at 6 (“Funds provide a means for a large amount of cash to enter 
nontraditional investments and help force assets to their true valuations.”). 
 55. See id. at 7 (explaining that markets become “more efficient as assets 
move closer to true valuation”). Furthermore, “with more capital in the market, 
investors can more easily trade through the increased liquidity.” Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that laws and rules 
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evolved over a number of decades, hedge fund regulation is 
scattered throughout various statutes and regulations.58 Part 
III.A analyzes how hedge funds have historically avoided 
traditional securities regulation. Next, Part III.B discusses past 
events that spurred interest in hedge fund regulation. Then, Part 
III.C explores past attempts to directly regulate hedge funds 
prior to the Dodd–Frank Act. 
A. Traditional Securities Regulation: Historical Exemptions for 
Hedge Funds 
Four pieces of legislation—the Securities Act of 1933,59 the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,60 the Investment Company Act 
of 1940,61 and the Investment Advisers Act of 194062—make up 
the core federal securities laws applicable to hedge fund 
regulation.63 Nevertheless, prior to the Dodd–Frank Act, hedge 
funds generally were able to avoid regulation under these laws 
through various exemptions.64 
                                                                                                     
affecting hedge funds have correlated with the evolution of the hedge fund).  
 58. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:1 (“As a result of the evolutionary 
development of the hedge fund, the regulation of these financial vehicles cannot 
be found in one concise codification.”). 
 59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2010) (requiring that any offer or sale of 
securities be registered with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act, unless an 
exemption from registration exists under the law). 
 60. See id. §§ 78a–78mm (creating various regulations on U.S. financial 
markets and establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the 
federal agency primarily responsible for enforcement of U.S. federal securities 
law).  
 61. See id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (directing the SEC to regulate investment 
companies and securities exchanges). 
 62. See id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (establishing federal laws to regulate and 
monitor investment advisers based on shareholder complaints of fraud). 
 63. See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. 
REV. 681, 682 (2000) (explaining that without certain exclusions and 
exemptions, “hedge funds would be subject to regulation under the Securities 
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act 
of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940”).  
 64. See Mota, supra note 38, at 58 (noting that hedge funds “often escape 
regulation because they fall within the exemption provisions” of the traditional 
U.S. federal securities laws). 
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The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) regulates primary 
market transactions in which a business entity (issuer) offers and 
sells its securities publicly to raise money.65 Importantly, the 
Securities Act requires issuers offering public securities to file a 
registration statement with the SEC.66 The registration 
statement serves as a disclosure mechanism that allows potential 
investors to gather information regarding “the issuer’s business, 
properties, material legal proceedings, directors and officers, 
ownership, and financials.”67 To raise money, hedge funds offer 
interests in their funds that usually fall within the Securities 
Act’s definition of “security.”68  
Recall that hedge funds typically form as hybrid entities, 
such as limited partnerships or limited liability companies.69 The 
Securities Act’s definition of security does not specifically 
mention any hybrid entity interests.70 Nevertheless, hedge fund 
interests offered to investors usually qualify as securities because 
they are interpreted as “investment contracts.”71 An investment 
contract, as defined by the Supreme Court, involves “investment 
in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of 
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial 
                                                                                                     
 65. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND ANALYSIS 38 (3d. ed. 2012) (explaining that the Securities Act “focuses on 
primary market transactions” and “requires issuers making a public offering to 
file mandatory disclosure documents containing information deemed important 
to investors”). 
 66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2010) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to 
sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise 
any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such 
security . . . .”). 
 67. See id. § 77g (detailing specific information required in the registration 
statement). 
 68. See id. § 77b(a)(1) (defining the term security under the Securities Act 
as any “note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture . . . 
investment contract,” and many other financial instruments). 
 69. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (noting that the vast 
majority of domestic hedge funds are set up as hybrid entities, such as limited 
partnerships or limited liability companies). 
 70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (providing the definition of 
security under the Securities Act). 
 71. See HAMMER, supra note 15, at 111 (explaining that most hedge fund 
interests offered to investors are interpreted as investment contracts, which is 
the “catch-all” category of the Securities Act’s security definition). 
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efforts of others.”72 Hedge funds offer their limited partnership 
and limited liability company interests to passive investors who 
receive nominal (or no) management authority—and because 
these investors expect profits from management (efforts of 
others), most hedge fund offerings qualify as investment 
contracts. 
Still, the majority of hedge funds avoid registration under the 
Securities Act because they use the private securities offerings 
exemption (private offering exemption).73 Under § 4(2) of the 
Securities Act, any “transactions by an issuer not involving a 
public offering” are exempt from having to comply with the 
Securities Act’s disclosure and registration requirements.74 
Furthermore, in 1983, the SEC promulgated Regulation D75 
under the Securities Act to clarify and provide more predictability 
for when funds trying to use the private offering exemption are 
exempt from registration.76 Rule 506 of Regulation D is most 
applicable to hedge funds because it provides a safe harbor for the 
private offering exemption in certain situations.77 For example, 
Rule 506 exempts from registration hedge fund offerings that 
meet certain conditions,78 including only offering interests to 
                                                                                                     
 72. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). Note 
that the quoted investment contract test in Forman is derived from the original 
investment contract test in SEC v. Howey. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
The original Howey investment contract test states, “The test is whether the 
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to 
come solely from the efforts of others.” Id. at 301. 
 73. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59 (detailing how most hedge fund 
securities offerings may avoid registration under the Securities Act using the 
private offering exemption found in § 4(2) of the Securities Act). 
 74. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2010) (establishing that the registration 
requirements provided in the Act do not apply to “transactions by an issuer not 
involving any public offering”). 
 75. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506 (2011) (establishing Regulation D to 
provide issuers with more clarity in private placements). 
 76. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 550 (explaining that the SEC 
promulgated Regulation D of the Securities Act to “provide issuers greater 
certainty in private placements”). 
 77. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (establishing a safe harbor for the § 4(2) 
exemption in the Securities Act). 
 78. See id. § 230.506 (detailing conditions that must be met in order for an 
offer or sale of securities to be exempt from registration requirements under 
Regulation D of the Securities Act). 
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purchasers that qualify as “accredited investors.”79 Most hedge 
funds comply with these limits and avoid registering their 
offerings under the Securities Act.80 In fact, the SEC has 
proposed rules to implement the newly enacted Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act81 that make Rule 506 even friendlier to 
hedge funds by eliminating the prohibition on general solicitation 
in private placements so long as the only purchasers are 
accredited investors.82 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) created 
the SEC83 and contains provisions that are relevant to hedge 
funds.84 Specifically, the Exchange Act regulates secondary 
market transactions in which “one investor resells securities of 
the issuer to another investor.”85 The Exchange Act requires 
periodic reporting to the SEC for certain companies that qualify 
under the statute (usually publicly-traded companies).86 Some of 
                                                                                                     
 79. See id. § 230.501(a) (providing the conditions that must be met in order 
to qualify as an “accredited investor” under the Securities Act). Generally, an 
individual with a net worth exceeding $1 million (excluding the individual’s 
home residence after the Dodd–Frank Act) or an individual whose total yearly 
income is more than $200 thousand will qualify as an accredited investor. Id. 
Also, a company or university with assets exceeding $5 million, usually, will 
qualify as an accredited investor. Id. These are the basic requirements for an 
accredited investor; however, there are more focused situations covered under 
Regulation D of the Securities Act. Also, Rule 506 of Regulation D allows an 
issuer to satisfy exemption requirements if the issuer offers interests to no more 
than thirty-five non-accredited purchasers. Id. § 230.506. 
 80. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 10 (“Hedge funds typically meet the 
requirements of Regulation D by limiting fund investors to individuals with 
high net worth or institutional investors that meet the minimum thresholds.”). 
 81. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (aiming to increase job creation and 
economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging 
growth companies). 
 82. See generally Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation 
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-9354 (Aug. 29, 2012). 
 83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2010) (establishing the SEC as a regime for 
regulating secondary markets). 
 84. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59–60 (noting that some of the provisions of 
the Exchange Act may apply to hedge funds). 
 85. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 1. Willa Gibson notes that the 
Exchange Act “covers all facets of the securities markets and all transactions 
involving securities, in contrast to the Securities Act which is directed primarily 
at the offering and distribution of securities.” Gibson, supra note 63, at 691. 
 86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (stating specific periodical and other 
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the Exchange Act’s provisions could affect hedge funds issuing 
equity.87 For example, a hedge fund would have to make 
extensive disclosures, through periodic reporting, to the SEC if it 
qualified as a public company under § 12(g)88 of the Exchange 
Act.89 To trigger § 12(g) and its associated rules, a hedge fund 
would have to issue equity interests to over 2000 persons—or 500 
persons who are not accredited investors—and the fund’s assets 
would need to exceed $10 million.90 Regardless, this threshold has 
been easy for hedge funds to avoid.91 Thus, the Exchange Act has 
not played a large part in the history of hedge fund regulation. 
Another traditional U.S. securities law, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act), has the 
potential to regulate hedge funds. Many financial funds, such as 
mutual funds, register as investment companies under the 
Investment Company Act.92 Registered investment companies are 
limited in the types of transactions they can use.93 For example, 
registered investment companies are restricted in their use of 
short sales and must obtain shareholder approval for investing in 
certain assets and borrowing substantial money.94 As discussed 
above, “[t]hese transactions are core elements of most hedge 
                                                                                                     
reporting requirements certain issuers of securities must file with the SEC). 
 87. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59–60 (discussing that the Exchange Act’s 
periodic reporting requirements could be relevant to hedge funds). 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (outlining when an issuer under the Exchange 
Act must register and providing certain exemptions). 
 89. See Mota, supra note 38, at 59–60. 
 90. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2010) (outlining when an issuer under the 
Exchange Act must register and providing certain exemptions). 
 91. See Mota, supra note 38, at 60 (“Most hedge funds . . . avoid registration 
under the 1934 Act . . . .”). 
 92. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting 
that mutual funds must register with the SEC under the Investment Company 
Act). 
 93. See id. (“The Investment Company Act places significant restrictions on 
the types of transactions registered investment companies may undertake.”). 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(3) (2010) (stating that it is unlawful for a 
registered investment company “to effect a short sale of any security,” except in 
certain situations, contrary to the rules and regulations promulgated by the 
SEC under the Investment Company Act); see also id. § 80a-13(a)(2) (stating 
that in most situations a registered investment company, without majority 
shareholder approval, cannot “borrow money, issue senior securities, underwrite 
securities issued by other persons, purchase or sell real estate or commodities or 
make loans to other persons”). 
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funds’ trading strategies.”95 The Investment Company Act 
requires investment companies—defined as almost any issuer 
which is “in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities”96—to register with the SEC and disclose investment 
activities, investment policies, and other information.97 Although 
hedge funds fall within the definition of an investment company, 
the Investment Company Act has two exemptions available to 
most hedge funds.98 First, any investment company that is not 
owned by more than 100 investors and does not plan to make a 
public offering of its securities is exempt.99 Hedge funds generally 
do not make public offerings, so this exemption is favorable to 
hedge funds with less than 100 investors.100 Second, the 
Investment Company Act exempts investment companies 
exclusively owned by “qualified purchasers.”101 This allows hedge 
funds owned solely by “qualified purchasers” to circumvent 
                                                                                                     
 95. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875. 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (stating that an investment company under 
the Investment Company Act is a broad term that means, but is not limited to, 
“any issuer which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes 
to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
securities”). 
 97. See id. § 80a-8(b) (stating that an investment company must disclose 
investment activities, investment policies, and other information when an 
investment company is required to register with the SEC under the Investment 
Company Act). 
 98. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that 
the definition of an investment company in the Investment Company Act 
“nominally describes hedge funds”). 
 99. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (explaining that “[a]ny issuer whose 
outstanding securities . . . are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred 
persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a 
public offering of its securities” is not recognized as an investment company 
under the Investment Company Act). 
 100. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (explaining most hedge funds “are 
exempt . . . because they have one hundred or fewer beneficial owners and do 
not offer their securities to the public”). 
 101. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2010) (noting an exemption for registration 
under the Investment Company Act is allowed for “[a]ny issuer, the outstanding 
securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of 
acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers”). Generally, a “qualified 
purchaser” is any person or family-owned company owning more than $5 million 
in investments or any person who owns and invests on a discretionary basis $25 
million or more. Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A). 
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registration under the Investment Company Act, even if the fund 
has more than 100 investors. 
The fourth traditional federal securities regulation relevant 
to hedge funds is the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers 
Act). The Advisers Act requires all investment advisers, including 
hedge fund advisers, to register with the SEC and disclose 
information such as compensation, the adviser’s balance sheet, 
the scope of the adviser’s authority, and other data.102 Prior to the 
Dodd–Frank Act, however, an exemption excused advisers 
managing less than fifteen clients from having to register with 
the SEC under the Advisers Act (private-adviser exemption).103 
To qualify for the private-adviser exemption, hedge fund advisers 
historically argued that each hedge fund they managed only 
counted as one client (rather than counting every investor in 
every hedge fund managed by the adviser).104 So, hedge funds 
could manage up to fourteen different hedge funds, regardless of 
the number of investors in each fund, and still be exempt from 
registration under the Advisers Act.105 Then, in 1984, to the 
delight of hedge fund advisers, the SEC passed a safe harbor rule 
that explicitly allowed private fund managers to count each fund 
managed as one client.106  
Nevertheless, Title IV of the Dodd–Frank Act (PFIARA) has 
repealed and amended sections of the Advisers Act.107 Most 
important to this Note (and as discussed below), the Dodd–Frank 
Act eliminated the private-adviser exemption from the Advisers 
Act.108 Although hedge funds have eluded traditional federal 
                                                                                                     
 102. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)–(c) (detailing disclosure and registration 
requirements for investment advisers under the Advisers Act). 
 103. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 12 (stating that the exemption under the 
Advisers Act allowed an exemption for advisers with fewer than 15 clients). 
 104. See id. (“Traditionally, hedge fund advisers avoided registration under 
the Advisers Act by arguing that fund managers maintain only one client, the 
hedge fund itself.”). 
 105. See Kaal, supra note 27, at 414 (“Even the largest hedge fund managers 
usually ran fewer than fifteen hedge funds and were, therefore, exempt.”). 
 106. See Mota, supra note 38, at 62 (“In 1985, the SEC adopted a rule 
allowing investment advisers to count each pooled investment vehicle as a 
single client.”). 
 107. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (discussing the implications of 
the Dodd–Frank Act’s amendments to the Advisers Act relating to the 
regulation of hedge funds). 
 108. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (same). 
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securities laws for decades, the Dodd–Frank Act’s amendments to 
the Advisers Act are the most direct regulation of hedge funds to 
date. 
B. 1990s: Major Hedge Fund’s Collapse Spurs Regulation Debate 
For decades, hedge funds avoided SEC registration and most 
regulation under the traditional federal securities laws without 
controversy. In the late 1990s, however, the collapse of the 
massive hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
sparked debate regarding the need for hedge fund regulation.109 
A group of highly reputable traders formed LTCM in 1994.110 
The fund had starting equity of $1.3 billion ($100 million of which 
was contributed by the general partners) and required outside 
investors to invest at least $10 million.111 At LTCM’s peak, in 
1997, the fund grew to larger than $7 billion after the fund made 
returns of 19.9% in 1994, 42.8% in 1995, 40.8% in 1996, and 
17.1% in 1997.112 LTCM typically used an investment strategy 
that held “long positions in bonds that it considered undervalued 
and short positions in bonds that it considered overvalued.”113 
Based on the yield spread between its positions in high- and low- 
risk bonds, LTCM would essentially bet on the spread to widen or 
narrow using derivatives contracts.114 
                                                                                                     
 109. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 200 (noting that the collapse, near 
bankruptcy, and bailout of LTCM in late 1990s sparked conversation about 
whether there was a need for additional hedge fund regulation). 
 110. See id. at 199 (noting that the general partners included a former head 
of bond trading at Salomon Brothers, a former vice chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, and two Nobel Prize recipients for work in the pricing of 
financial instruments). 
 111. See id. at 197 (explaining that LTCM was formed in February 1994 
with equity of $1.3 billion, of which $100 million came from its general partners, 
and the fund “required a minimum investment of $10 million, and no 
withdrawals for three years”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 197–98. 
 114. See id. at 198 (explaining that LTCM would buy “high-yielding, less 
liquid bonds, such as Danish mortgage-backed securities” and then sell short 
“low-yielding, more liquid bonds, such as U.S. government bonds”). Then, if 
LTCM thought “the yield spread between the high and low risk bonds . . . was 
excessively wide,” the fund would bet on the spread to narrow using derivatives 
contracts. Id. 
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In early 1998, LTCM became convinced, for a number of 
reasons, the yield spread between its high- and low-risk bonds 
was too wide; thus, LTCM bet on the yield spread to narrow.115 
LTCM borrowed $125 billion from banks (on top of the fund’s 
then $4.8 billion AUM) and increased its leverage ratio (debt-to-
equity ratio) to more than 20-to-1.116 This leverage ratio, which is 
extraordinarily large for any hedge fund, would magnify gains or 
losses depending on the widening or narrowing of LTCM’s yield 
spread.117 Later that year, a number of circumstances instilled 
fear in global bond investors and there was a “stampede to 
quality” bonds.118 Thus, LTCM’s yield spread widened (instead of 
narrowed) and the fund’s failed bet was exposed.119 
In September 1998, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
became worried about LTCM’s creditors (including banks and 
securities firms) that would suffer losses as a result of LTCM’s 
collapse.120 A creditor consortium, including the government, 
decided that the collapse of LTCM posed “systemic risk” (due to 
the number of overexposed parties and the amount of money 
involved) and agreed to a bailout of over $3.6 billion.121 Systemic 
risk is defined as the risk that “an economic shock such as a 
                                                                                                     
 115. See id. at 198 (“LTCM believed that in late 1997 and early 1998, partly 
as a consequence of the collapse of Asian countries in the summer of 1997, the 
yield spread between high and low risk bonds . . . was excessively wide.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. (describing LTCM’s leverage ratio in 1998 as “high by any 
standard”). Because the leverage ratio was so high, “[e]ven a small reduction in 
yield spreads would mean huge profits for LTCM.” Id. On the reserve side, 
losses would be magnified as well. Id. 
 118. See id. at 199 (“As fear spread of what the market repercussions to . . . 
market breakdowns might be . . . there was a stampede to ‘quality.’”). This 
stampede to quality meant bond investors began to dump their more risky 
bonds for safer (yet lower-yielding) bonds. Id. Among the leading reasons for 
global fear in the bond market was the result of Russia devaluing its currency 
and refusing to honor contracts sold to customers. Id. 
 119. See id. (“This sharp widening of yield spreads caused by a stampede to 
liquidity and quality was just the opposite of what LTCM was betting on.”). 
 120. See id. at 200 (explaining that in September 1998, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York became aware of LTCM’s potential collapse and held 
meetings to discuss the situation). 
 121. See id. (describing how a creditor consortium decided to bailout LTCM 
to the tune of $3.6 billion after the group decided LTCM’s collapse posed 
systemic risk based on the amount of money involved and the number of 
overexposed lenders involved). 
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market or institutional failure triggers (through panic or 
otherwise) either the failure of a chain of markets or institutions 
or a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, resulting 
in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability.”122 Systemic risk can be paralleled to a domino effect 
in which a trigger event (here LTCM’s collapse) “causes a chain of 
bad economic consequences” that have the potential to bring 
down other financial institutions and overall markets.123 LTCM’s 
collapse was the first event that clearly demonstrated hedge 
funds could have systemic risk consequences. The magnitude of 
LTCM’s exposure to other market participants showed that a 
massive hedge fund’s failure could have devastating effects on the 
overall market.124 
As a result of LTCM’s collapse, the government issued two 
reports detailing what went wrong with LTCM and how the 
hedge fund industry could be better regulated.125 The first report 
by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets,126 
recommended that more information on hedge funds should be 
disclosed publicly to prevent hedge funds from overleveraging 
their investments.127 This report also urged lenders to establish 
better standards for evaluating hedge funds when extending 
credit.128 The second report, conducted by the United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO), confirmed that LTCM’s 
massive size and leverage created systemic risk that posed a 
                                                                                                     
 122. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
 123. Id. at 198. 
 124. See id. at 203 (“In LTCM, the potential for systemic risk existed not by 
reason of its intrinsic status as a hedge fund but by the sheer size of its exposure 
to other institutions and market participants.”). 
 125. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (“In the wake of LTCM, two 
significant governmental studies were issued in 1999.”). 
 126. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf . 
 127. See id. at 31 (“Improving transparency through enhanced disclosure to 
the public should help market participants make better, more informed 
judgments about market integrity and the creditworthiness of borrowers and 
counterparties.”). This is because the report thought “[t]he central public policy 
issue raised by the LTCM episode is how to constrain excessive leverage more 
effectively.” Id. 
 128. See id. at 30 (explaining that there was a breakdown in market 
discipline of lending practices during the LTCM situation). 
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threat to the financial system.129 Nevertheless, these reports 
focused on improving public information about hedge funds 
through disclosure rather than calling for the exemptions for 
hedge funds in traditional securities laws to be amended or 
repealed.130 
In response to these reports and the crash of LTCM, 
Congress proposed two bills that suggested information-gathering 
strategies to prevent another major hedge fund collapse, rather 
than direct regulation.131 The first bill, the Hedge Fund 
Disclosure Act (1999 Disclosure Bill),132 required “unregulated 
hedge funds” to submit certain information to the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve 
Board).133 The bill defined an unregulated hedge fund as any 
private fund with $3 billion or more in capital that was not 
registered under the Investment Company Act; this also included 
any family or group of pooled hedge funds with AUM of $20 
billion or more.134 These unregulated hedge funds would have to 
make public quarterly reports including the funds’ total assets, 
derivatives positions, leverage ratios, and other measures of 
market risk identified by the Federal Reserve Board (and other 
government actors such as the SEC).135 Hedge funds could 
request that some proprietary information, such as investment 
                                                                                                     
 129. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (“The second study, conducted by the 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO), also focused on LTCM’s 
extensive leverage and its potential adverse impact on the financial system as a 
whole.”). 
 130. See Mota, supra note 38, at 63 (explaining that of the reports and 
recommendations that were issued in the aftermath of LTCM, none of them 
recommended “changes to . . . the exemptions for hedge funds under” traditional 
federal securities laws). 
 131. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (explaining that two bills came in 
response to LTCM’s collapse and the ensuing government studies). 
 132. See H.R. 2924, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Disclosure Bill] 
(proposing federal legislation that requires certain hedge funds to disclose 
specified information to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 133. See id. § 4 (describing that unregulated hedge funds have to submit 
quarterly reports to the Federal Reserve Board). 
 134. See id. § 3(3) (providing the definition for unregulated hedge fund 
under the proposed legislation). 
 135. See id. § 4(a) (detailing the information that an unregulated hedge fund 
would have to provide to the Federal Reserve Board on a quarterly basis). 
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strategies, be kept confidential from the public.136 Congress 
recognized that hedge funds had the potential to affect systemic 
risk, but it did not think direct regulation was the best option.137 
Still, the proposed legislation called for “reliable information 
about hedge fund activities”138 to ensure that the government 
could prevent (or, if necessary, control) the collapse of any major 
hedge funds that could cause a “severe burden on the United 
States financial system.”139 
The second bill introduced was the Derivatives Market 
Reform Act of 1999 (1999 Reform Bill).140 It aimed to reduce 
systemic risk in the financial markets through “enhance[d] 
oversight over certain derivatives dealers and hedge funds.”141 
Titles I and II of the 1999 Reform Bill dealt largely with 
derivatives markets.142 Title III, however, shared many of the 
same reporting requirements for certain hedge funds as the 
proposed 1999 Disclosure Bill.143 The 1999 Reform Bill required 
quarterly reporting to the SEC for “unregistered hedge funds,” 
defined as “any pooled investment vehicle, or group or family of 
pooled investment vehicles, that has total AUM of $1 billion or 
more,” and is not registered under the Investment Company 
Act.144 Thus, the threshold for reporting was $2 billion lower than 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. § 4(c) (explaining that a hedge fund may request that 
“proprietary information concerning investment strategies and positions” in a 
quarterly report “be segregated in a confidential section of the report which 
shall not be available to the public”). 
 137. See id. § 2 (stating that the congressional findings noted that hedge 
funds can potentially “pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the United 
States and international financial systems,” but “market forces, rather than 
government regulations, are the best tools for constraining hedge funds”). 
 138. Id. § 2(8). 
 139. Id. § 2(7). 
 140. See H.R. 3483, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Reform Bill] 
(“[A]mend[ing] federal securities laws to enhance oversight over certain 
derivatives dealers and hedge funds, reduce the potential for such entities to 
increase systemic risk in the financial markets, enhance investor protections, 
and other purposes.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. §§ 101, 201 (providing reform for federal securities laws dealing 
with certain derivatives dealers and broker-dealer oversight).  
 143. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (noting the similarities in the 
quarterly reporting requirements, for certain hedge funds, of the 1999 Reform 
Bill compared to those of the 1999 Disclosure Bill). 
 144.  H.R. 3483, 106th Cong. § 301(k)(5)(A) (1999). 
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the 1999 Disclosure Bill, and it had no “family or group” of pooled 
hedge funds distinction. The quarterly reports would include 
detailed financial information and “[a] description of the models 
and methodologies that the pooled investment vehicle use[d] to 
calculate, assess, and evaluate market risk.”145 This information 
would be made public by the SEC and shared amongst various 
federal agencies.146 The 1999 Reform Bill also allowed hedge 
funds to request that information, such as trading strategies, be 
kept confidential.147 
Ultimately, Congress did not enact either of the two bills.148 
The collapse of LTCM was soon regarded as a one-off that was 
unlikely to occur again.149 Many saw LTCM as an outlier to the 
hedge fund industry and believed banks (and other lenders) had 
tightened their lending practices enough to avoid another such 
build-up of excessive leverage.150 The hedge fund industry vowed 
to become more transparent to its investors, providing additional 
comfort that increased hedge fund regulation was unnecessary.151 
Although no direct regulation of hedge funds resulted from the 
collapse of LTCM, the situation sparked more serious debate for 
hedge fund regulation.152 
                                                                                                     
 145. Id. § 301(k)(1)(A)–(F). 
 146. See id. § 301(k)(3) (describing the availability of the quarterly reports 
upon the SEC’s receipt under the 1999 Reform Bill). 
 147. See id. § 301(k)(4) (stating the procedures for the confidentiality of 
proprietary information under the 1999 Reform Bill). 
 148. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:3 (noting that neither the 1999 
Disclosure Bill nor the 1999 Reform Bill were enacted). 
 149. See id. (“As the events of 1998 receded in time, there was a growing 
appreciation that the facts surrounding LTCM were not representative of hedge 
funds in general.”). 
 150. See id. (explaining that in 1998 the International Monetary Fund and 
The President’s Working Group noted that banks, and other lenders, had 
improved their management of hedge fund exposures through better credit 
practices after the collapse of LTCM). 
 151. See id. (discussing how the “hedge fund industry itself responded with 
initiatives to improve risk management and provide greater transparency to 
investors”). 
 152. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 17 (suggesting that 2004 hedge fund 
regulation proposals were, in part, a result of reports and meetings that 
occurred after the collapse of LTCM). 
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C. 2004: Push for Direct Hedge Fund Regulation 
The debate regarding hedge fund regulation did not seriously 
resurface until 2003 when the SEC called for a Hedge Fund 
Roundtable.153 At that time, the technology bubble had burst and 
investors were looking for alternative ways to invest their 
money.154 As a result, the SEC noticed that hedge funds were 
enjoying an influx of capital and the industry was growing.155 
This led to the rise of so-called “funds of funds,” which invest in a 
variety of different hedge funds to maintain exposure to the 
hedge fund industry while diversifying portfolio allocations.156 
The SEC became concerned that funds of funds could directly 
expose less wealthy—and often less-sophisticated—individual 
investors to hedge funds through public offerings.157 The SEC 
acknowledged, however, most of these offerings were limited to 
institutional investors (pension funds, public companies, etc.).158 
Meanwhile, institutional investors also were investing more in 
general hedge funds, so less-sophisticated individual investors, 
who had invested in various institutional investors, were now 
being indirectly exposed to hedge funds.159 And, in the 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Mota, supra note 38, at 63 (noting that the SEC held a Hedge Fund 
Roundtable in 2003 to discuss the possibility of a hedge fund study). 
 154. See LEDERMAN, supra note 4, § 3:4 (noting that when the bull market of 
the 1990s came to an end, with the burst of the technology bubble, more 
investors looked to alternative investments, such as hedge funds). 
 155. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund 
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter 2004 Hedge Fund Rule] (noting that in 2003 the 
hedge fund industry assets had grown 30% in the previous year and 260% in the 
previous five years). 
 156. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE 
FUNDS 67 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (defining a fund of hedge funds as a “hedge fund 
that utilizes a multi-manager, multi-strategy approach by investing all, or a 
significant portion of its assets in hedge funds”). 
 157. See 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057 (noting “the 
development of ‘funds of hedge funds’ ha[d] made hedge funds more broadly 
available to investors” by 2003). 
 158. See id. (explaining that only institutional investors participated in the 
offerings of most funds of hedge funds in 2003). 
 159. See id. at 72,058 (explaining that in the few years before 2003, “a 
growing number of public and private pension funds, as well as universities, 
endowments, foundations, and other charitable organizations, ha[d] begun to 
invest in hedge funds or ha[d] increased their allocations to hedge funds”). 
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background of all of this, the SEC had seen an increase in their 
enforcement actions against fraudulent hedge fund advisers.160 
By September 2003, the SEC issued a report called 
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds (2003 Report)161 that 
recommended direct regulation of hedge funds through the 
Advisers Act based on various public policy concerns.162 The 2003 
Report cited the growth of hedge funds, growth in hedge fund 
fraud, and broader exposure to hedge funds as reasons for direct 
regulation.163 The 2003 Report noted that prior SEC staff reports 
had studied the systemic risks posed by hedge funds, but this 
report chose to focus on “the growth and investor protection 
implications of hedge funds.”164 
Accordingly, in 2004, the SEC promulgated a rule under the 
Advisers Act entitled the Registration Under the Advisers Act of 
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers (2004 Hedge Fund Rule).165 The 
SEC cited the 2003 Report’s policy reasons for the administrative 
action.166 The 2004 Hedge Fund Rule made changes to how an 
adviser could qualify for registration exemption under the 
Advisers Act.167 Recall that hedge fund advisers were 
traditionally exempt from SEC registration under the Advisers 
Act if they managed less than fifteen clients—and prior to the 
                                                                                                     
 160. See id. at 72,056 (stating that by 2003 the SEC had seen a “growth in 
the number of [SEC] hedge fund fraud enforcement cases”). 
 161. 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 156. 
 162. See id. at 88 (noting that the 2003 Report’s primary recommendation to 
the SEC was to “consider mandating federal registration of hedge fund 
investment advisers under the Advisers Act” based on a variety of concerns). 
 163. See id. at 76–88 (outlining the growth of hedge funds, the growth in 
hedge fund fraud, and the broader exposure to hedge funds as reasons for 
recommending regulation of hedge funds under the Advisers Act to the SEC). 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. See 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (stating that the SEC adopted the 2004 
Hedge Fund Rule to require certain hedge funds to register with the SEC under 
the Advisers Act). 
 166. See id. at 72,055–059 (citing growth of hedge funds, growth in hedge 
fund fraud, and broader investor exposure to hedge funds as the primary 
reasons for promulgating the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule). 
 167. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2004), invalidated by Goldstein v. 
SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring hedge funds to count 
“shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries” as clients for 
purposes of § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act). 
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2004 Hedge Fund Rule, hedge fund advisers could count each 
fund they managed as one client rather than counting every 
individual investor in each managed fund.168 This enabled hedge 
fund advisers to manage fourteen separate funds, each with 
multiple investors, and still qualify for the private-adviser 
exemption under the Advisers Act.169 The 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 
however, required hedge fund advisers to “look-through” each of 
their managed funds and actually count every individual client in 
each fund.170 Consequently, the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule required 
most hedge funds to register with the SEC by February 1, 
2006.171 
The SEC passed the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule by a narrow 3–2 
vote.172 The two dissenting SEC commissioners did not think 
registration under the Advisers Act was the best alternative and 
argued that the SEC should have “collected and analyzed the 
existing information [on hedge funds] and determined what new 
information would be useful before imposing mandatory 
registration.”173 The dissent also suggested this was a misuse of 
the SEC’s already limited resources.174 Not surprisingly, most 
hedge fund advisers were unhappy about having to register with 
the SEC, and it did not take long before a prominent hedge fund 
                                                                                                     
 168. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text (discussing historical 
exemptions for hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act). 
 169. See Verret, supra note 2, at 806 (noting that before the 2004 Hedge 
Fund Rule, “[e]ven the largest hedge fund managers usually ran fewer than 
fifteen hedge funds and were, therefore, exempt”). 
 170. See 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,066 (requiring hedge 
fund advisers “to ‘look-through’ the funds to count the number of investors as 
‘clients’ for purposes of the private-adviser exemption” under the Advisers Act). 
 171. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The [2004 
Hedge Fund Rule] had the effect of requiring most hedge fund advisers to 
register by February 1, 2006.”). 
 172. See Kaal, supra note 27, at 415 (“The [2004 Hedge Fund Rule] was 
eventually issued by a [3–2] vote . . . .”). This was not a party-line vote as 
Chairman William H. Donaldson (Republican) joined Harvey J. Goldschmid 
(Democrat) and Roel C. Campos (Democrat) in favor of the 2004 Hedge Fund 
Rule. Cynthia A. Glassman (Republican) and Paul S. Atkins (Republican) 
dissented. 
 173. 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,089 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). 
 174. See id. at 72,090 (arguing that the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule would result 
in a misuse of the SEC’s limited resources). 
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manager challenged the regulation in court.175 In Goldstein v. 
SEC,176 on June 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia invalidated the look-through provision of the 2004 
Hedge Fund Rule.177 With the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule vacated, 
hedge fund managers reverted back to counting each fund they 
managed as one client to qualify for the private-adviser 
exemption under the Advisers Act. 
After Goldstein vacated the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC 
did not pursue an appeal. The SEC, however, remained focused 
on protecting hedge fund investors from fraudulent hedge fund 
advisers.178 In 2007, instead of attempting another round of direct 
regulation, the SEC proposed179 and adopted Rule 206(4)-8 
(Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule) under § 206 of the Advisers Act.180 
Specifically, the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule prevents hedge 
fund advisers from “making false or misleading statements to 
investors” or “otherwise defrauding” them.181 The SEC noted that 
it “would not need to demonstrate that an adviser violating [the 
Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule] acted with scienter [(knowledge or 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Verret, supra note 2, at 809 (“In June of 2006, Philip Goldstein and 
his hedge fund Opportunity Partners L.P. challenged the SEC's equation of 
‘client’ with ‘investor’ in the new regulation.”). 
 176. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the 2004 
Hedge Fund Rule, requiring that investors in a hedge fund be counted as clients 
of the fund’s adviser for purposes of the private-adviser exemption from 
registration under the Advisers Act, was invalid). 
 177. See id. (vacating the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule). 
 178. See Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) 
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) (recommending that the SEC 
promulgate an anti-fraud rule under the Investment Advisers Act after the 
decision in Goldstein). 
 179. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment 
Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 400, 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 275) 
(proposing an anti-fraud rule that would affect all hedge fund advisers). 
 180. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment 
Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,756 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 275) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule] (adopting an anti-fraud rule 
that “prohibits advisers to [hedge funds] from making false or misleading 
statements to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or prospective investors in 
those [hedge funds]”). 
 181. Id. For the full codification of the SEC’s Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, 
see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2011). 
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intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud)].”182 The SEC decided 
that using a negligence standard for determining the liability of 
fraudster hedge fund advisers is appropriate under the Hedge 
Fund Anti-Fraud Rule.183 Furthermore, the Rule extends to all 
hedge fund advisers, including those exempt from SEC 
registration.184 The Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, therefore, has 
a lower standard than the “catch-all” anti-fraud securities rule 
under the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, which requires scienter for 
liability.185 Although the SEC did not ultimately prevail with 
direct adviser registration through the 2004 Hedge Fund Rule, 
the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule is a serious disincentive for 
fraudulent activity by hedge fund advisers. 
IV. Direct Hedge Fund Regulation under Title IV (PFIARA) of the 
Dodd–Frank Act 
Part IV.A looks at the basics of the Financial Crisis and the 
role hedge funds played in it. Part IV.B details the implications of 
the enactment of Title IV of the Dodd–Frank Act (PFIARA). 
A. Two Failed Hedge Funds Kick-Off Financial Crisis 
Although the causes of the Financial Crisis are myriad and 
complex (and largely beyond the scope of this Note), the general 
background of the crisis will help shed light on hedge fund 
regulation under the Dodd–Frank Act. By 2006, there was a flood 
of capital into the U.S. real estate market because of low interest 
rates and investor optimism surrounding “seemingly ever-rising 
housing prices.”186 Through securitization, which “involves 
                                                                                                     
 182. Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759. 
 183. See id. at 44,759 (“[The SEC] believe[s] use of a negligence standard 
also is appropriate as a method reasonably designed to prevent fraud.”). 
 184. See id. at 44,758 (“[The Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule] applies to both 
registered and unregistered investment advisers.”). 
 185. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Inc., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007) 
(“To establish liability under § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] and Rule 10b-5, a 
private plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienter, a mental 
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”) (citing Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1976)). 
 186. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4. 
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pooling income-generating assets and then selling interests in the 
pool that derive their value from those underlying assets,”187 a 
broad range of investors became exposed to mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs).188 In MBSs, mortgages (the underlying, 
income-generating asset) are pooled together and then investors 
can buy securities representing claims to the underlying income 
stream.189 
Banks used credit enhancements for MBSs, such as 
guarantees covering defaulting mortgages in the pool, to 
encourage investor confidence.190 Banks also hired credit-rating 
agencies to rate the securities for marketing purposes.191 The 
credit-rating agencies rated the MBSs using models that assumed 
the U.S. housing market would continually rise and mortgage 
default rates would remain low.192 This led to more investors 
exposing themselves to what they thought was a low-risk, always 
appreciating U.S. housing market. As demand for MBS-type 
investments increased, “more complex pools-of-pools 
(collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs)—and even pools-of-
pools-of-pools (so called CDO squared)—emerged.”193 And, as 
money rolled into the housing market, banks “started to lend 
heavily to subprime mortgage borrowers with weak credit 
ratings” to sustain the process.194 
By 2007, mortgage defaults increased, for a variety of 
reasons, and these MBSs (and CDOs) began to rapidly lose 
                                                                                                     
 187. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of 
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 313 (2011). 
 188. See id. at 314 (“Between 1996 and 2007 the stock of outstanding 
securitized credit in the United States would expand almost five-fold . . . .”). 
 189. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 164 (describing a general 
asset-backed security). 
 190. See Bruner, supra note 187, at 313 (explaining that mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) were “often bolstered by credit enhancements, including 
guarantees obligating the sponsoring bank to cover defaulting mortgages in the 
pool”). 
 191. See ROBERT C. POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? 49 (2010) (noting that banks 
hired credit-rating agencies to analyze and rate MBSs in order to be competitive 
with other securities). 
 192. See Bruner, supra note 187, at 314 (discussing how credit ratings for 
MBSs “were built on quantitative models assuming low default rates and rising 
home values”). 
 193. Id. at 313. 
 194. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4. 
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value.195 Consequently, credit-rating agencies downgraded many 
of their ratings for MBSs because their underlying assumptions 
proved misguided.196 Because many hedge funds and banks had 
taken large positions in MBSs and CDOs, this created systemic 
risk.197 At the same time, many investors had participated in 
credit default swaps.198 A credit default swap—in which one party 
agrees to pay the principal amount if a home mortgage defaults 
in exchange for a stream of payments from the counterparty—is 
supposed to serve a risk-hedging function for MBSs in case of 
default (almost like insurance).199 Nevertheless, many hedge 
funds (and other investors) used credit default swaps for 
speculative purposes to profit from the defaulting MBSs and 
declining housing market.200 When the housing market crashed, 
however, many of these credit default swaps became worthless 
because counterparties could not pay the large volume of credit 
default swaps coming due at one time.201 Thus, without a hedge 
for the toxic mortgage-backed investments that so many financial 
institutions held, a domino effect of financial crisis spread across 
the United States.202  
Notably, the systemic risk implications of the housing 
market, and the involvement of hedge funds in the crisis, came to 
                                                                                                     
 195. See id. (explaining that in 2006 and 2007 “mortgage defaults increased 
significantly” and “[t]he resulting deterioration in mortgage performance 
adversely affected mortgage-backed securities and their more complicated 
variants”). 
 196. See POZEN, supra note 191, at 60 (explaining that as subprime 
mortgages began to default, the credit-rating agencies downgraded the ratings 
of many MBSs). 
 197. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 166 (“The correlated positions 
of banks and hedge funds in CDOs and MBSs created systemic risk.”). 
 198. See Bruner, supra note 187, at 314 (noting that “outstanding credit 
default swaps—derivative contracts equally suitable for hedging risks on 
mortgage-related securities and speculating against them—literally 
skyrocketed” between 2001 and 2007). 
 199. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 166 (describing a general 
credit default swap and its typical uses). 
 200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (explaining that credit 
default swaps can be used for speculative as well as hedging purposes). 
 201. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 65, at 166–67 (explaining that when 
the housing market declined, “the web of credit default swaps started to 
unravel” and many credit default swaps became essentially worthless). 
 202. See id. at 167 (discussing that when many banks and other institutions 
could no longer hedge against the deteriorating MBSs, the crisis spread). 
682 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651 (2013) 
the forefront in July 2007.203 At that point, two Bear Stearns 
hedge funds “that had invested heavily in CDOs failed.”204 In 
March 2008, Bear Stearns was bailed out when the government 
orchestrated a buyout by J.P. Morgan.205 Bear Stearns’s failure, 
sparked by the collapse of two of its hedge funds, was the 
beginning of an economic contagion that infected the United 
States.206 
Soon more serious systemic risk consequences came to light 
as a result of the massive amount of leverage in the financial 
system, “particularly among investment banks and hedge 
funds.”207 When financial institutions began suffering huge losses 
because of deteriorating MBSs, many institutions had to sell 
liquid assets to maintain required leverage ratios.208 Because 
banks and other institutions needed cash on their balance sheets, 
they began “calling outstanding loans of hedge funds and other 
institutional investors.”209 Many of these hedge funds were highly 
leveraged, so they also had to sell liquid assets to pay the 
banks.210 Furthermore, “credit became scarce and interest rates 
soared on short-term debt” because banks were hesitant to lend 
in the midst of so much financial uncertainty.211 
This created a ripple effect in which financial entities began 
selling liquid assets for cash, especially publicly-traded stocks.212 
                                                                                                     
 203. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that in “July 2007, two Bear 
Stearns hedge funds that had invested heavily in CDOs failed”); see also Beville 
et. al., supra note 7, at 855–56 (noting that “systemic implications became 
apparent as large subprime lenders warned of significant losses” and when 
“Merrill Lynch seized $400 million in assets of a Bear Stearns fund that 
incurred heavy losses in mortgage-backed investments”). 
 204. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 4. 
 205. See id. (“An ad hoc government rescue was hurriedly put in place, 
culminating in JP Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns.”). 
 206. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting that the collapse of the 
Bear Stearns hedge funds signaled the beginning of the Financial Crisis). 
 207. POZEN, supra note 191, at 122. 
 208. See id. at 123 (explaining that losses in MBSs forced financial 
institutions to sell assets to maintain required leverage ratios). 
 209. Id. at 122. 
 210. See id. (noting that because hedge funds were highly leveraged, they 
also were forced to sell assets in order to pay the banks calling outstanding 
loans). 
 211. Id. at 123. 
 212. See id. at 122 (“Since the markets for corporate bonds and asset-backed 
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This process, known as “deleveraging,” creates a cycle in which 
firms “sell assets, [and] prices decline in response to the increased 
supply, creating further losses and potentially requiring 
additional selling.”213 Ultimately, the crisis in the housing market 
spread to the capital markets, and the U.S. stock market 
plummeted by over 38% in 2008.214 With systemic risk 
consequences in full effect, the Financial Crisis developed into 
one of the worst recessions in the United States’ history.215 
B. Dodd–Frank Title IV (PFIARA) 
In response to the Financial Crisis, Congress passed the 
Dodd–Frank Act to promote financial stability in the United 
States.216 One of the primary ways the Dodd–Frank Act seeks to 
provide this stability is by monitoring financial markets for 
systemic risks.217 Importantly, Congress established the FSOC218 
to identify systemic risks and “respond to emerging threats” to 
the U.S. financial system.219 In light of these goals, and to fill 
what many saw as a regulatory gap, Title IV of the Dodd–Frank 
Act (PFIARA) was enacted to regulate hedge funds directly.220 
                                                                                                     
securities were frozen, the sellers turned to their most liquid holdings—publicly 
traded stocks.”). 
 213. Id. at 123. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that the “economy sank into 
the deepest recession in decades” because of the Financial Crisis). 
 216. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (stating the Dodd–
Frank Act was enacted to “promote the financial stability of the United States”). 
 217. See, e.g., id. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571–72 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-4) (establishing a system in which the SEC can require certain 
private fund advisers to report information for the assessment of systemic risk 
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)).  
 218. See id. § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392–93 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 5321) (establishing the FSOC). 
 219. Id. § 112(a), 124 Stat. at 1394–95 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 5322). 
 220. See id. § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3) (eliminating the private-adviser exemption under the Advisers Act that most 
hedge funds relied on to avoid SEC registration). 
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1. What Is the Point of the PFIARA? 
The PFIARA has two goals: (i) to provide better protection to 
private fund investors from private fund advisers; and (ii) to 
assess systemic risk posed by private funds.221 The PFIARA 
primarily aims to further the first goal by amending adviser 
registration and reporting requirements under the Advisers 
Act.222 The second goal is to be accomplished by requiring 
registered advisers to file certain information with the SEC that 
the FSOC can then use to assess systemic risk.223 The PFIARA 
defines a private fund as an investment fund that falls under the 
Investment Company Act (but for any exemptions under the 
Investment Company Act).224 The SEC makes clear that this 
definition includes hedge funds.225 
2. Who Has to Register Under the Advisers Act Because of the 
PFIARA? 
The PFIARA requires all hedge fund advisers to register 
under the Advisers Act unless exempted.226 Notably, the PFIARA 
eliminates the private-adviser exemption under the Advisers Act 
                                                                                                     
 221. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-57, at 866 (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CRPT-111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf (stating Title IV of the Dodd–
Frank Act “expands the advisers’ reporting requirements to the SEC as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors or for the assessment of risk by the FSOC”). 
 222. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 403–404, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1571–74 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(amending adviser registration and reporting requirements under the Advisers 
Act). 
 223. See id. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-3) (requiring private fund advisers registered under the Advisers Act to 
submit certain information to the SEC that the FSOC can use to assess systemic 
risk). 
 224. See id. § 402(a)(29), 124 Stat. at 1570 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-2) (defining private fund under the PFIARA).  
 225. See Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund 
Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and 
Foreign Private Advisers, Release No. IA 3222, at 3 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter 
SEC Exemptions Release] (“Private funds include hedge funds . . . .”). 
 226. See Dodd–Frank Act § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (providing the exemptions for hedge fund adviser 
registration under the Advisers Act). 
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that hedge fund advisers traditionally relied on to avoid SEC 
registration.227 Instead, the PFIARA sets out a narrow list of 
exemptions, so that more private fund advisers have to register 
with the SEC.228 The first exemption for adviser registration 
includes any private fund adviser who manages solely private 
funds and has AUM less than $150 million.229 Thus, if a hedge 
fund adviser manages more than $150 million in assets, 
regardless of the number of clients in the fund(s), she must 
register with the SEC under the Advisers Act. States will have 
responsibility for hedge fund advisers with AUM between $25 
million and $100 million.230 The determination of AUM is to be 
made annually.231 
The second exemption is for “family office” funds as defined 
by the SEC.232 A family office fund cannot have clients other than 
“family clients.” Family clients include current and former family 
members, certain key employees of the family office, charities 
funded exclusively by family clients, and other entities as deemed 
appropriate by the SEC.233 These funds must be exclusively 
controlled by one or more family members and wholly owned by 
family clients.234 The SEC notes that the premise behind the 
                                                                                                     
 227. See id. (eliminating the private-adviser exemption under the Advisers 
Act). 
 228. See SEC Exemptions Release, supra note 225, at 3 (“The primary 
purpose of Congress repealing § 203(b)(3) [of the Advisers Act] was to require 
advisers of ‘private funds’ to register under the Advisers Act.”). 
 229. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–
74 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (explaining an exemption 
from registration for private fund advisers managing solely private funds and 
with AUM less than $150 million). 
 230. See id. § 410, 124 Stat. at 1576–77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-3a) (providing the assets threshold for federal registration of investment 
advisers). 
 231. See SEC Exemptions Release, supra note 225, at 90 (stating that an 
adviser must “annually calculate the amount of private fund assets it 
manages”). 
 232. See Dodd–Frank Act § 409, 124 Stat. at 1575–76 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2) (providing the adviser registration exemption for family 
office funds). 
 233. See Family Offices, Release No. IA 3220, at 6 (June 22, 2011) (defining 
the term family client under the family office fund adviser registration 
exemption). 
 234. See id. at 30 (outlining the family ownership and control requirements 
for a private fund to qualify for the family office exemption under the Advisers 
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family office fund exemption is “to allow families to manage their 
own wealth.”235 Interestingly, the SEC takes the approach that 
key employees can participate in family funds, without 
registering under the Advisers Act, because their position and 
experience enable them to protect themselves as investors.236 
Furthermore, exempting key employees allows family office funds 
to attract talented investment professionals.237 The family office 
fund exemption, therefore, allows families (and key employees) to 
manage hedge funds, regardless of AUM, without having to 
register with the SEC. 
The third exemption is for qualifying venture capital funds’ 
advisers.238 The venture capital fund must fit into a narrow set of 
criteria to avail its adviser(s) of this exemption.239 To be exempt 
as a venture capital fund adviser, the private fund must generally 
limit leverage, represent itself as pursuing a venture capital 
strategy to its investors, and not offer redemption rights to 
investors (among other criteria).240 Because of its narrow 
language, virtually no hedge funds will qualify for the venture 
capital fund exemption. The final exemption, for certain foreign 
private advisers, is extremely narrow and beyond the scope of 
this Note.241 
                                                                                                     
Act). 
 235. Id. at 28. 
 236. See id. at 23–30 (discussing the SEC’s rationale for allowing key 
employees to be included in family office funds). 
 237. See id. at 28 (explaining that permitting key employees in family office 
funds “allows family offices to attract talented investment professionals”). 
 238. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 407, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574–
75 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (outlining the adviser 
exemption for certain venture capital fund advisers). 
 239. See id. (stating the venture capital fund adviser exemption criteria will 
be promulgated by the SEC). 
 240. See SEC Exemptions Release, supra note 225, at 9–72 (providing a full 
summary of the criteria required for the venture capital fund adviser 
exemption). 
 241. See Dodd–Frank Act § 403, 124 Stat. at 1571–74 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (providing an adviser exemption for certain foreign private 
advisers). To qualify for the foreign private-adviser exemption, a hedge fund 
adviser must have AUM less than $25 million (among other criteria). Id. 
Because this threshold is so narrow, this exemption is unlikely to have any 
significant effect on systemic risk. 
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3. PFIARA Goal 1: How Will Investor Protection Be Furthered? 
As mentioned, the PFIARA’s first goal aims to provide 
greater investor protection by amending adviser registration and 
reporting requirements under the Advisers Act.242 Because hedge 
fund advisers managing over $150 million now have to register 
under the Advisers Act, they have to file Form ADV with the 
SEC. Form ADV is the form used by investment advisers to 
register with the SEC.243 The SEC states that the data collected 
from Form ADV is used “to protect investors” and “to create risk 
profiles of investment advisers.”244 
Form ADV, divided into Part One and Part Two, is updated 
by the registered investment adviser at the end of each year 
(some information requires more frequent updating).245 Part One 
requires information about the investment adviser’s business, 
ownership, clients, employees, business practices, affiliations, 
and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its employees (in 
addition to other information).246 Part Two requires registered 
advisers to provide new and prospective clients with a brochure 
and brochure supplements containing most of the information 
required in Form ADV’s Part One.247 All of the information 
disclosed under Form ADV is fully available to the public.248 
Interestingly, the SEC now requires all exempt private funds 
to file Part One of Form ADV as well.249 And, even though the 
                                                                                                     
 242. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text (discussing investor 
protection as a goal of the PFIARA). 
 243. See Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/formadv.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“Form ADV is the uniform form 
used by investment advisers to register with both the SEC and state securities 
authorities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 244. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, Release No. IA 3221, at 54 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter SEC 
Implementing Release]. 
 245. See id. at 16 (describing when a registered adviser must update Form 
ADV). 
 246. See Form ADV, supra note 243 (explaining the general requirements of 
Form ADV’s Part One). 
 247. See id. (explaining the general requirements of Form ADV’s Part Two). 
 248. See SEC Implementing Release, supra note 244, at 49 (stating that all 
information contained in Form ADV and filed with the SEC is to be made 
available to the public). 
 249. See id. at 40 (explaining exempt reporting advisers still have to report 
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adviser is exempt from registration, the disclosed information is 
available to the public.250 The SEC explains that “Congress gave 
[it] broad authority under §§ 203(l) and 203(m) of the Advisers 
Act to require exempt reporting advisers to file reports as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.”251 The SEC thinks public reporting 
requirements will “provide a level of transparency that will help 
[it] to identify practices that may harm investors, will aid 
investors in conducting their own due diligence, and will deter 
advisers’ fraud and facilitate earlier discovery of potential 
misconduct.”252 
The SEC plans to monitor the data collected from Form ADV 
and then conduct “examinations” on advisers that raise red 
flags.253 In an examination, the SEC checks the adviser’s books 
and records for conflicts of interest and other misconduct. 
Although exempt and registered advisers are subject to 
examinations, former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro stated that 
the SEC does “not intend to conduct routine examinations” of 
exempt reporting advisers because “[a]s many observers know, 
the [SEC] has scarce resources and it is important therefore that 
[it] target those resources toward the advisers actually 
registered.”254 
4. PFIARA Goal 2: How Will the Systemic Risks of Private Funds 
Be Assessed? 
The second goal of the PFIARA, the assessment of systemic 
risk posed by hedge funds, is to be accomplished through a 
                                                                                                     
information on Part One of Form ADV). 
 250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the public 
availability of information reported with Form ADV). 
 251. SEC Implementing Release, supra note 244, at 110. 
 252. Id. at 49–50. 
 253. See id. at 117 (noting that the information from Form ADV will allow 
the SEC “to conduct targeted examinations of private fund advisers”). 
 254. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement 
at SEC Open Meeting: Dodd–Frank Act Amendments to the Investment 
Advisers Act (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2011/spch062211mls-items-1-2.htm. 
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collection of data for the FSOC to assess.255 The SEC will collect 
this data using the newly created Form PF.256 The SEC requires 
all registered hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act to file 
Form PF.257 The SEC, however, has differentiated reporting 
requirements based on whether the hedge fund adviser is a 
“Small Private Fund Adviser” or a “Large Private Fund 
Adviser.”258 A Small Private Fund Adviser of a hedge fund has 
AUM between $150 million and $1.5 billion.259 A Large Private 
Fund Adviser of a hedge fund has AUM over $1.5 billion.260 Form 
PF is divided into four sections, but only Section 1 and Section 2 
apply to hedge funds.261 
All registered hedge fund advisers (Large and Small Private 
Fund Advisers) must fill out Section 1 of Form PF.262 Section 1a 
requires registered hedge fund advisers to provide basic 
information about any hedge funds they manage.263 Section 2b 
asks for more detailed information about each fund, such as each 
fund’s gross and net assets, the aggregate value of its derivatives 
positions, and its use of leverage.264 This section also asks for the 
“percentage of the fund’s equity held by the five largest equity 
holders.”265 The SEC says Section 1b “is designed to allow the 
                                                                                                     
 255. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of 
the PFIARA). 
 256. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain 
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisers on Form PF, 
Release No. IA 3308, at 7 (October 31, 2011) [hereinafter Form PF Release] 
(stating that registered advisers must submit Form PF to the SEC to satisfy 
systemic risk reporting requirements under the PFIARA). 
 257. See id. at 18 (describing which investment advisers must file Form PF). 
 258. See id. at 20–21 (differentiating adviser reporting requirements for 
Form PF based on the size of the hedge fund). 
 259. See id. at 21 (explaining the Small Private Fund Adviser threshold 
under Form PF). 
 260. See id. (explaining the Large Private Fund Adviser threshold under 
Form PF). 
 261. See id. at 20–21 (noting which sections of Form PF are applicable to 
hedge funds). 
 262. See id. at 63 (stating that all registered hedge funds are required to fill 
out Section 1 of Form PF). 
 263. See id. at 63–65 (outlining information required by Section 1a of Form 
PF). 
 264. See id. (outlining information required by Section 1b of Form PF). 
 265. Id. at 65–66. 
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FSOC to monitor certain systemic risks for the broader private 
fund industry.”266 The final part of Section 1, Section 1c, gathers 
data on each separate hedge fund managed by the adviser, such 
as “each fund’s investment strategies and the percentage of the 
fund’s assets managed using high-frequency trading 
strategies.”267 In addition, advisers have to identify each hedge 
fund’s top trading counterparties and information on trading and 
clearing practices.268 The SEC states Section 1c is “designed to 
enable FSOC to monitor systemic risk that could be transmitted 
through counterparty exposure, track how different trading 
strategies are affected by and correlated with market stresses, 
and follow the extent of private fund activities conducted away 
from regulated exchanges and clearing systems.”269 
 Section 2 of Form PF requires information solely from 
Large Private Fund Advisers of hedge funds (AUM greater than 
$1.5 billion).270 The SEC tailored Section 2 to acquire additional 
data focused on “relevant areas of financial activity that have the 
potential to raise systemic concerns.”271 Section 2a requires Large 
Private Fund Advisers of hedge funds to give very detailed 
reports on the value of “assets invested (on a short and long 
basis) in different types of securities and commodities (e.g., 
different types of equities, fixed income securities, derivatives, 
and structured products).”272 The SEC believes this will help the 
FSOC monitor different asset classes typically held by hedge 
funds and show trends in hedge funds’ exposures.273 Section 2b 
requires further disclosure on each separate hedge fund managed 
with a net asset value over $500 million at the end of any month 
in the prior fiscal quarter.274 Advisers must disclose information 
such as portfolio liquidity, large institutional positions, posting of 
                                                                                                     
 266. Id. at 73. 
 267. Id. at 74–75. 
 268. See id. (describing information required by Section 1c of Form PF). 
 269. Id. at 76. 
 270. See id. at 21 (explaining large hedge fund advisers must complete 
Section 2 of Form PF). 
 271. Id. at 77. 
 272. Id. at 78. 
 273. See id. at 82 (explaining the rationale behind Section 2a of Form PF). 
 274. See id. at 83 (describing the requirements of Section 2b of Form PF). 
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collateral by counterparties, leverage, and internal risk 
assessments.275 
Large Private Fund Advisers have a quarterly reporting 
requirement, and Small Private Fund Advisers only have to make 
annual reports.276 The SEC designed the Large Private Fund 
Adviser threshold for hedge funds to gather more systemic risk 
information on a substantial portion of assets in the hedge fund 
industry.277 The SEC estimates that the $1.5 billion threshold 
will capture “over 80% of the U.S. hedge fund industry.”278 
Comparatively, Small Private Fund Advisers of hedge funds have 
to report less information, less frequently, than Large Private 
Fund Advisers. This is because, from a systemic risk monitoring 
perspective, the SEC does not think additional information or 
more frequent reporting is justified for hedge funds smaller than 
$1.5 billion.279  
All of the information gathered in Form PF is to remain 
confidential because of its proprietary and sensitive nature.280 
The information, however, may be shared with other federal 
departments, agencies, or self-regulatory organizations within 
the scope of their jurisdiction, subject to confidentiality 
agreements.281 The SEC said it will also coordinate with foreign 
financial regulators using the Form PF data.282 The SEC 
promises to adopt controls and systems to protect the 
confidentiality of the collected information.283  
                                                                                                     
 275. See id. at 83–97 (providing a full summary of Section 2b reporting 
requirements under Form PF). 
 276. See id. at 50 (stating the frequency of reporting for Form PF based on 
hedge fund size). 
 277. See id. at 31 (explaining the rationale behind the Large Private Fund 
Adviser threshold for hedge funds on Form PF). 
 278. Id. at 31. This is 2011 data that comes from a hedge fund industry 
survey that the SEC has access to called HedgeFund Intelligence. Id. 
 279. See id. at 54 (explaining the rationale behind the smaller hedge fund 
adviser reporting requirement on Form PF). 
 280. See id. at 112 (explaining the rationale behind keeping information 
gathered from Form PF confidential). 
 281. See id. (discussing entities that the Dodd–Frank Act allows Form PF 
data to be shared with). 
 282. See id. at 11 (noting that the Dodd–Frank Act “states that FSOC shall 
coordinate with foreign financial regulators in assessing systemic risk”). 
 283. See id. at 115 (explaining potential controls and systems that the SEC 
may use to protect the confidentiality of Form PF data). 
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Ultimately, the SEC gives the acquired data to the FSOC.284 
The FSOC uses the data to monitor hedge fund activities and 
trends in the hedge fund industry that relate to systemic risk.285 
The FSOC interprets the data and decides whether hedge funds’ 
activities or trends “could create or increase the risk of significant 
liquidity, credit, or other problems spreading” across U.S. 
financial markets.286 Then, the FSOC can make recommendations 
to applicable regulatory agencies to “apply new or heightened 
standards and safeguards for a financial activity or practice” that 
is causing systemic risk.287 Also, if the FSOC finds that a 
particular hedge fund—based on “the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities” of the 
hedge fund—poses a systemic threat to the financial stability of 
the United States, it can require the Federal Reserve Board to 
supervise the hedge fund.288 
V. Analysis and Recommendations 
Part V of this Note provides a final analysis of hedge fund 
regulation after the enactment of the PFIARA. Part V.A analyzes 
whether hedge fund adviser registration under the Advisers Act 
is necessary in light of the PFIARA’s goals. Part V.B provides 
recommendations for hedge fund regulation going forward. 
                                                                                                     
 284. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–
74 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4) (stating that the SEC must 
collect information related to the assessment of systemic risk from certain 
private investment funds and provide that information to the FSOC). 
 285. See id. § 112(a), 124 Stat. at 1394–96 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5322) (detailing the purposes and duties of the FSOC). 
 286. Id. § 120(a), 124 Stat. at 1408–09 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5330). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. § 113(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1398 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5323).  
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A. Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary in Light of the 
PFIARA? 
This section analyzes whether hedge fund adviser 
registration under the Advisers Act is necessary in light of the 
PFIARA’s two goals: hedge fund investor protection and hedge 
fund systemic risk assessment.289 This Note argues that hedge 
fund adviser registration is unnecessary because the PFIARA’s 
goals can be met without it. Thus, resources are being wasted 
from the perspective of the hedge fund industry and the SEC. 
1. Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Is Unnecessary for Investor 
Protection 
At first blush, the PFIARA’s hedge fund adviser registration 
requirements do not seem particularly onerous. Much of the 
proprietary information that hedge fund advisers have to disclose 
will not be reported on Form ADV.290 Instead, items like trading 
strategies and asset positions will be reported on Form PF and 
kept confidential.291 Passed after a moment of crisis, the PFIARA 
integrated hedge fund adviser registration into the Dodd–Frank 
Act—an Act largely concerned with controlling systemic risks to 
avoid a national financial meltdown.292 Thus, the issue becomes 
whether adviser registration, from an investor protection 
standpoint, squares with the core goals of the Dodd–Frank Act 
and whether adviser registration is even necessary in the hedge 
fund industry.  
The Advisers Act “is mainly a registration and anti-fraud 
statute.”293 There is nothing to suggest, however, that hedge 
funds’ involvement in the Financial Crisis stemmed from 
fraudster hedge fund advisers. Although the SEC states hedge 
                                                                                                     
 289. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (stating the two goals of the 
PFIARA). 
 290. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing reporting information required by 
Form ADV). 
 291. See supra Part IV.B.4 (same). 
 292. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of 
the Dodd–Frank Act and the circumstances surrounding its enactment). 
 293. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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fund investor protection is a goal of the PFIARA, it does not offer 
any evidence that hedge fund adviser fraud played a key role in the 
Financial Crisis.294 As discussed, many academics are reluctant to 
state (with certainty) the exact part hedge funds had in the 
Financial Crisis.295 But many academics agree that hedge funds 
contributed to the systemic risk consequences that resulted in (and 
from) the Financial Crisis.296 For example, many suggest that some 
hedge funds speculated against deteriorating MBSs by using credit 
default swaps, other hedge funds invested heavily in toxic CDOs 
(Bear Stearns), and many hedge funds played a large role in the 
deleveraging process of the financial system that further intensified 
the crisis.297 Nonetheless, it has not been proposed that hedge fund 
adviser fraud played a key role in the Financial Crisis. 
Recall, in 2007, the SEC passed the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud 
Rule, which provides a route for the SEC to bring actions against 
fraudster hedge fund advisers using a negligence standard.298 
The Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule, therefore, has a lower 
standard for liability than Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act.299 
Furthermore, after the crash of LTCM, hedge funds vowed to 
provide their investors with more transparency.300 Since then, 
investors and counterparties to hedge funds “demand, and usually 
receive, disclosure to the extent it helps them assess the merits of 
their investments.”301 In addition, the SEC now requires 
                                                                                                     
 294. The SEC does not offer any evidence that hedge fund adviser fraud 
related to the Financial Crisis in its Implementing Release, the SEC 
Exemptions Release, or the SEC Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser 
Examinations following the Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act. 
 295. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (acknowledging that hedge 
funds’ involvement in the Financial Crisis is not fully understood).  
 296. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the roles, of which many academics 
agree, hedge funds played in the Financial Crisis). 
 297. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the roles, of which many academics 
agree, hedge funds played in the Financial Crisis). 
 298. See supra notes 178–83 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s 
promulgation of the Hedge Fund Anti-Fraud Rule). 
 299. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 10b-5’s 
liability standard). 
 300. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining how the hedge 
fund industry vowed greater transparency to investors after the crash of 
LTCM). 
 301. Schwartz, supra note 122, at 218. 
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exempt hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act to file certain 
information about each fund they manage on Form ADV.302 This 
information is publicly available, and the SEC suggests that it will 
provide investors with more transparency and deter adviser fraud.303 
The hedge fund industry also, from an investor protection 
standpoint, has many safeguards. Hedge funds require high initial 
investments that restrict the industry to sophisticated investors.304 
Hedge funds also limit interests in their funds to accredited 
investors305 to avoid reporting requirements under the Securities 
Act.306 The Dodd–Frank Act actually heightened standards for what 
qualifies as an accredited investor under the Securities Act in private 
offerings.307 This will further ensure that hedge funds offer their 
interests to more sophisticated parties. In sum, hedge fund adviser 
registration is unnecessary because (i) there is already an adequate 
anti-fraud rule in place; (ii) hedge funds have increased transparency 
to their investors; and (iii) hedge funds have a sophisticated investor 
class that does not need the same protections provided to ordinary 
investors. 
In addition, there are a few other thoughts worth noting. 
First, there are financial and resource concerns from the 
perspective of smaller hedge fund advisers, and, more 
importantly, the SEC. Not all funds can afford to hire new 
compliance officers to gather the information required by adviser 
registration under the Advisers Act.308 Although $150 million in 
                                                                                                     
 302. See supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
SEC requires exempt private hedge fund advisers under the Advisers Act to 
report information on Form ADV’s Part One). 
 303. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning 
behind why the SEC is requiring exempt private hedge fund advisers under the 
Advisers Act to report certain information that will be publicly available). 
 304. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing how hedge funds 
require significant minimum investments). 
 305. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the term 
accredited investor under the Securities Act). 
 306. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining the term 
accredited investor under the Securities Act). 
 307. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 
(2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b note) (adjusting the accredited 
investor standard under the Securities Act so that the net worth of an 
accredited investor must be over $1 million excluding the value of the investor’s 
primary residence). 
 308. See Azam Ahmed, For Small Hedge Funds, Success Brings New 
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AUM seems large on the surface, some smaller hedge fund 
advisers note that this is just a blip in an almost $1.6 trillion 
industry.309 This threshold appears over-inclusive in a sector that 
the SEC estimates is dominated by funds managing over $1.5 
billion in assets (over 80% of all hedge fund AUM).310 Also, the 
SEC admits that it has limited resources to carry out hedge fund 
adviser examinations in light of the PFIARA. In a study required 
by the Dodd–Frank Act, Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser 
Examinations, the SEC stated “[it] will not likely have sufficient 
capacity in the near or long term to conduct effective 
examinations of registered investment advisers with adequate 
frequency” after the PFIARA’s enactment.311 The increased strain 
on smaller funds and the SEC are additional reasons why hedge 
fund adviser registration under the Advisers Act is unnecessary. 
Also lurking in the background of whether or not hedge fund 
adviser registration is necessary under the Dodd–Frank Act, is 
another question: Even if hedge fund adviser fraud was a 
legitimate reason for passing the PFIARA, is hedge fund adviser 
registration the best option to combat this supposed problem? 
Although this raises a host of issues that are likely the topic of 
another discussion, history suggests adviser registration has its 
weaknesses. The recent uncovering of the shocking, and 
financially devastating, Ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff312—who 
had voluntarily registered his hedge funds with the SEC and 
                                                                                                     
Headaches, N.Y TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 20, 2011, 8:00 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/for-small-hedge-funds-success-brings-
new-headaches/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (detailing the financial burdens many 
smaller hedge funds will face as a result of the Dodd–Frank Act) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 309. See id. (explaining that one hedge fund adviser thinks $150 million 
funds are the “guppies” of the industry and do not pose great risks to the U.S. 
financial system). 
 310. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (detailing hedge fund data 
used by the SEC). 
 311. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER 
EXAMINATIONS 3–4 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal. 
pdf.  
 312. The author thanks George Mason University School of Law Professor 
J.W. Verret for pointing out this interesting dynamic as it related to this Note. 
Also, the author thanks Professor Verret for noting potential reasons for the 
hedge fund industry’s apathy towards the Dodd–Frank Act’s adviser 
registration amendments. See infra notes 314–16 and accompanying text. 
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whose fraudulent activity went undetected for years313—suggests 
that adviser registration may not be the government’s solution to 
the kind of fraudulent activity that it fears, regardless of whether 
or not this registration is necessary under the Dodd–Frank Act. 
Lastly, although some suggest that many hedge funds 
remain unconcerned about adviser registration,314 this may be 
more telling of another story. In an industry dominated by larger 
funds,315 perhaps existing funds do not mind adviser registration 
because smaller funds are more likely to bear the brunt of the 
costs.316 Further, SEC registration expenditures will certainly 
raise entry costs for start-up hedge funds, which may deter future 
competition. The hedge fund industry’s apathy towards this new 
legislation, therefore, could be the combination of a couple things: 
(i) large, existing hedge funds may view adviser registration as a 
vehicle that will help them maintain their top status by stifling 
smaller competition; and (ii) the hedge fund industry may not 
think that adviser registration presents much of an obstacle at 
all, which calls into question whether such registration serves as 
a deterrent for issues like adviser fraud. 
2. Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Is Unnecessary for Systemic 
Risk Assessment 
The collection of systemic risk information related to hedge 
funds is a logical solution for hedge fund regulation. Hedge funds 
have evolved into a large part of the U.S. financial markets. 
                                                                                                     
 313. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO 
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 20–21 (2009), http://www. 
sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (“[T]he SEC received more than ample 
information . . . over the years to warrant a thorough and comprehensive 
examination and/or investigation of Bernard Madoff . . . for operating a Ponzi 
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 314. See generally Bloomberg BNA, Hedge Funds Not Concerned About SEC 
Registration, Study Finds, SEC. L. DAILY (Apr. 16, 2012) http://news. 
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Washington and Lee Review). 
 315. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
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Current hedge fund data is scattered throughout a variety of 
industry surveys and a lot of information about hedge funds 
remains opaque.317 The confidentiality of Form PF protects the 
secretive nature of the hedge fund industry and preserves the 
dynamic trading strategies that make hedge funds a viable 
alternative investment.318 Also, the FSOC’s wait-and-see 
approach (monitoring the information, studying it, and making 
recommendations) allows it to obtain a full grasp on the evolving 
issues of the hedge fund industry (such as systemic risk concerns) 
before acting rashly.319 
Nevertheless, hedge fund adviser registration under the 
Advisers Act is unnecessary to gather information related to 
systemic risk. If the government wants to collect systemic-risk-
related data from hedge funds, then why not simply collect the 
information? Congress and the SEC could require hedge funds 
(deemed to impact systemic risk) to report the exact information 
in Form PF to the FSOC without hedge fund adviser regulation. 
This would save the SEC’s (admittedly) limited resources and 
would reduce adviser registration compliance costs for smaller 
hedge funds—most importantly, it would accomplish the 
PFIARA’s goal of assessing the systemic risks that stem from 
hedge funds. This practical alternative would reduce costs and 
provide a smooth transition because the FSOC regime is already 
in place. 
B. Recommendations 
This Note asserts that hedge fund adviser registration 
requirements should be eliminated under the PFIARA. As 
explained, hedge fund adviser registration is unnecessary from 
the investor protection standpoint and the systemic risk 
assessment standpoint alike. But continuing to gather systemic-
risk data from hedge funds through Form PF is a logical solution 
                                                                                                     
 317. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the hedge fund 
industry as opaque). 
 318. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (stating the confidentiality 
of Form PF). 
 319. See supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
FSOC will utilize Form PF data). 
HEDGE FUND ADVISER REGISTRATION 699 
because it fills an information gap for an opaque, but important, 
industry. The information required by Form PF provides the 
FSOC with detailed information that will help with the 
monitoring of systemic risk. 
Currently, the SEC thinks hedge funds with AUM exceeding 
$1.5 billion should provide the most information connected with 
systemic risk because these funds make up an estimated 80% of 
the hedge fund industry.320 Arguments favoring this threshold 
make sense because it includes a majority of the hedge fund 
industry. Also, this amount is similar to the thresholds proposed 
in the 1999 Disclosure Bill (over $3 billion AUM) and the 1999 
Reform Bill (over $1 billion AUM), which both dealt with 
controlling hedge-fund-related systemic risks after LTCM’s 
collapse.321 Determining a threshold for what aggregate group of 
hedge funds would provide the most pertinent information 
related to systemic risk, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Note.  
Nonetheless, once the threshold is determined, this Note 
asserts that only data from the group of hedge funds deemed 
most important to systemic risk assessment should be collected. 
So, if the government determines hedge funds with more than 
$1.5 billion AUM are most pertinent to systemic risk assessment, 
requiring hedge funds with less than $1.5 billion AUM to report 
data would be over-inclusive and a waste of resources. At the 
same time, any exemptions (relating to systemic risk data 
collection) for hedge funds exceeding the determined threshold 
would render the policy under-inclusive. This Note, therefore, 
suggests that once the line is drawn, no hedge funds with AUM 
exceeding the determined threshold should be exempt from 
providing information on Form PF. This is because “size matters” 
when determining systemic risk concerns.322 
For example, family office hedge funds with AUM that would 
exceed the determined threshold should not be exempt from 
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reporting information related to systemic risk. The theory behind 
exempting family office hedge funds is that these extremely 
private funds and families (along with key investment employees 
of the family office fund) should be able to manage their wealth 
without interference.323 But what makes a tight-knit family fund 
managing billions of dollars less likely to affect systemic risk 
than a similarly situated hedge fund whose investors are not 
blood relatives? Famous hedge fund manager George Soros 
recently kicked outside investors of his Soros Fund Management 
hedge fund to the curb.324 Soros does not want to disclose any 
information in light of the PFIARA’s enactment, so he decided the 
family office fund exemption was in his best interest.325 The Soros 
Fund Management hedge fund has AUM of approximately $25 
billion.326 What is to say this fund’s failure or risky investment 
decisions could not affect systemic risk? After all, George Soros is 
the same hedge fund adviser who almost single-handedly crushed 
the British pound sterling in currency markets by betting on its 
devaluation in 1992 (and subsequently made around $1 billion off 
the bet).327 Thus, to thoroughly evaluate systemic risks posed by 
hedge funds, all hedge funds that are deemed important to 
systemic risk assessment (whether alone or in the aggregate) 
should provide information to the FSOC without exception. 
There are problems, however, with this approach. First, 
compliance costs will still be high for hedge funds. But, given the 
serious consequences of the Financial Crisis, it is hard to make 
an argument that more information is not needed on systemic 
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risk—especially information on a largely opaque hedge fund 
industry. Second, it is questionable whether the SEC and the 
FSOC have the resources and expertise to adequately assess the 
systemic risk information given by hedge funds. This is a 
legitimate concern, but the only practical alternative is to 
establish a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO). Common 
“[s]ecurities SROs include national securities exchanges and 
securities associations registered with the SEC, such as the New 
York Stock Exchange.”328 Practitioners and academics proposed 
this idea prior to the Financial Crisis and the Dodd–Frank Act.329 
The premise is that the hedge fund industry could regulate itself 
through a private SRO that would coordinate with government 
regulatory agencies.330 The SRO would be able to respond more 
quickly to evolving hedge fund trends and would have more 
expertise in dealing with hedge funds.331 There is a strong 
argument for self-regulation through an SRO, but Congress has 
largely ignored it. 
The Dodd–Frank Act required the GAO to conduct a 
feasibility study for a hedge fund adviser SRO, but, for a variety 
of reasons, the report was largely dismissive of the idea.332 The 
report stated that while an SRO for hedge fund advisers is 
feasible, it would require legislative action and present 
challenges.333 Among other concerns, the report suggested that a 
hedge fund adviser SRO would present conflict-of-interest issues 
and funding the SRO would be expensive.334 The GAO report 
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suggested that the SRO might actually “increase the overall cost 
of regulation by adding another layer of oversight.”335 The report 
was also concerned that transparency would be limited because 
the “SRO would be accountable primarily to its members rather 
than to Congress or the public.”336 Although there is a strong 
argument for a private SRO, the practical implications of the 
GAO report suggest that it is an unlikely option. 
Finally, there are confidentiality concerns in providing 
information related to systemic risk to the SEC and the FSOC 
with Form PF. The hedge fund industry has a competitive 
advantage in creating unique investment strategies.337 These 
unique strategies prevail because competitors have not been able 
to use reverse engineering techniques to copy others’ strategies.338 
This is possible because hedge funds have been able to keep 
proprietary information confidential. Some will argue that 
allowing the government to share the collected information with 
other agencies and foreign governments (subject to confidentiality 
agreements) poses a huge threat to hedge funds. The SEC has 
stated, however, that it will not require systemic information 
reporting through Form PF until it has controls and systems in 
place.339 Thus, the only way to advance this counterargument is 
to suggest a hypothetical circumstance in which the government 
does not follow through on its confidentiality promise. Because 
that argument is largely speculative, it does not hold much 
weight. 
VI. Conclusion 
For years, proponents of hedge fund regulation called for 
Congress to fill what they perceived as a regulatory gap. 
Although hedge funds avoided most regulation for decades, the 
Financial Crisis tipped the scales toward direct federal 
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regulation. The enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act, and more 
specifically the PFIARA, forces many hedge funds to register with 
the SEC under the amended Advisers Act. This Note asserts, for 
several reasons, that hedge fund adviser registration under the 
Advisers Act is unnecessary to advance the PFIARA’s goals: 
hedge fund investor protection and hedge fund systemic risk 
assessment. Consequently, hedge fund adviser registration is a 
waste of the hedge fund industry and the SEC’s resources. 
This Note, however, suggests that the collection of hedge 
fund data, related to systemic risk, is necessary in light of the 
Financial Crisis, but adviser registration is unnecessary to 
achieve this goal. This Note provides more practical and tailored 
alternatives to accomplish this task. Mainly, this Note asserts 
that once a threshold (based on hedge fund size) is determined for 
an aggregate group of hedge funds most pertinent to systemic 
risk assessment, the FSOC should collect data directly through 
Form PF. Collecting data from smaller hedge funds that do not 
meet the determined threshold is unnecessary because this will 
produce an over-inclusive regime. On the other hand, this Note 
also argues that once a proper threshold is established, no hedge 
funds with AUM exceeding the determined threshold should be 
exempt from providing information related to systemic risk. This 
will avoid an under-inclusive element to the regime as well and 
accomplish the PFIARA’s most important goal—hedge fund 
systemic risk assessment. 
  
